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Software Defined Network (SDN) architecture has been widely used in various application domains. Aiming at the authentication
and security issues of SDN architecture in autonomous decentralized system (ADS) applications, securing the mutual trust among
the autonomous controllers, we combine trusted technology and SDN architecture, and we introduce an authentication protocol
based on SDN architecture without any trusted third party between trusted domains in autonomous systems. By applying BAN
predicate logic and AVISPA security analysis tool of network interaction protocol, we can guarantee protocol security and provide
complete safety tests. Our work fills the gap of mutual trust between different trusted domains and provides security foundation
for interaction between different trusted domains.
1. Introduction
Autonomous decentralized systems (ADS) have been
extended and applied to a variety of domains [1–6].Themain
extension in ADS is to implement the dynamic manage-
ment and to optimize the allocation of virtualized computing,
storage, device controllers, and cyber resources. The current
major platforms aremature inmanagement and optimization
of traditional computing and storage resources. However,
the dynamic management and the allocation of ADS
devices as cyber resources are a new problem which has not
been studied thoroughly. The problem is mainly from net-
work architecture design.The traditional TCP/IP architecture
cannot meet the increasing demands, especially the virtua-
lized network and ADS services. Thus, ADS needs new net-
work architecture and techniques with flexibility, robustness,
security, and credibility to solve the problem.
In the next generation network architecture design, many
experts and scholars have completed a series of remarkable
research work. Specifically, OpenFlow [7], introduced by
Nick McKeown, gave researchers a way to run experimen-
tal protocols in the networks. Based on Software Defined
Network (SDN) and OpenFlow protocol, researchers imple-
mented network management and security functions mainly
in the aspects of control, traffic forwarding, and load bal-
ancing. But the security issue in OpenFlow design should
be thoroughly concerned, especially the security interaction
function between different controllers’ nodes. The problem
of security certification issues between the different single
controllers limits the interaction range of a SDN architecture,
which is only used in a single domain with a single controller,
such as the Data Center.
In order to solve secure interaction issues, experts and
scholars have completed a series of research work. Reference
[7] proposed the SANE network architecture in which logic
controllers could provide secure authentication for device
access and loading strategy. Moreover, [8] further extended
SANE network architecture with data forwarding strategy
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by using core controller method. The improved architecture
implemented with data forwarding function, in a certain
extent, could solve the security threats between controller
layer and data forwarding layer.
Reference [9] implemented a new network architecture
GENI and recognized that a large number of malicious
attacks and flood attacks can be easily spread through
logic control layers and data forwarding layers and lead to
corresponding secure issues, for instance, DDoS attack.
Reference [10] evaluated the weakness of OpenFlow
protocol. The author thought OpenFlow had an accurate
secure certificationmethodbetween controllers and switches,
but this method did not provide security mechanisms under
transport layer.
Based on SDN architecture, [11] did a comprehensive
analysis for evaluating NOX, POX, Ryu, and Beacon [12–15]
controllers in compatibility, reliability, security, and process-
ing capacity. Focusing on the aspect of security, the authors
pointed out that the reason tomost controllers’ security prob-
lems was forged stream message length, protocol version, or
wrong type of message flow.
Besides, in [16], the authors analyzed the entire SDN secu-
rity issues and pointed out that the new network architecture
with a rapid response and antithreatening security mecha-
nism was needed to be reestablished, especially in the differ-
ences of security threats between controllers and traditional
network.
Based on the above issues, one of the key features of
ADS is to allow content-basedmessage broadcasting. In order
to ensure the real-time system, message package could not
be encrypted. The receiver node does not check whether
the source address is valid or not, and whether the message
package has been tampered or not. It means that an attacker
can set up the entire attack in essentially one operation.While
the security for ADS is drawing attention, it is an indisputable
fact that there is a lack of effective methods to support
those frameworks. The contributions of our paper are as fol-
lows:
(1) Our paper introduces a new architecture to increase
the probability of guaranteeing the credibility for
future network architecture by applying the ideas of
trusted network to ADS. The new architecture with
trusted functionmodules canmeasure sensitive infor-
mation and provide a security interaction function
between different SDN domains.
(2) Based on the new architecture with trusted function
modules, we propose a trusted domain authentication
protocol that protects controllers’ credibility among
entire network architecture when communicating
with a nontrusted third party. Trusted function mod-
ules, such as Trusted Measurement Module (TMM)
and TCG Software Stack (TSS), could provide a set
of services to ensure authentication protocol’s secu-
rity, for example, encryption, decryption, digital sign,
or key management. The protocol gets trust certifica-
tions among different trusted domains and provides
secure base in domain session.
(3) We demonstrate security of our trusted domain
authentication protocol by BAN logic and AVISPA
security analysis system and perform a comparative
analysis of our trusted domain authentication proto-
col against some prevalent protocols, namely, IKEv2
[17], IDAKE-MA, and SKAP [18], in performance
analysis. We believe that the protocol performance,
including calculating consumption and storage con-
sumption, is an index which can give us obviously
evidence to prove advantage of our protocol.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
a SDN trusted domain network architecture and describes
our trusted domain authentication protocol. In Section 3, we
demonstrate security of our protocol by the BAN logic [19]. In
Section 4, we analyze security of our protocol with different
malicious test scenarios by AVISPA security analysis system
[20]. Section 5 performs an analysis between our protocol
and some authentication protocols.
2. Security Authentication Protocol for
ADS Applications
As shown in Figure 1, we propose a SDN trusted domain
network architecture which combines SDN and trusted com-
puting. This architecture contains a single controller and a
number of network devices. For solving the trust certification
problem among trusted domains, we design somemodules in
SDN controller. TMM, based on TSS [21], is used to measure
the sensitive information of SDN controller and connect
network devices. Sensitive information includes controller
platform hardware information, controller platform OS
information, controller software information, and trusted
function modules information. Controller Flow Rule (CFR)
is trusted policy, including SDN data forwarding strategy
and trusted measurement strategy, which was measured by
TMM. Controller Communication Module (CCM) ensures
controller authentication process between individual trusted
domains.
In SDN trusted domain network architecture, we propose
a domain secure certificated protocol between SDN trusted
domains, and, in particular, our protocol can be utilized on
nontrusted third party circumstance. From the viewpoint of
the trusted chain [22], we can implement a consistency test of
measuring information integrity about controller hardware,
operating system, controller software, and CCM for trusted
negotiation. After finishing trusted negotiation, we can adopt
themethod ofmultilevel authentication to guarantee security.
More specific, controller authentication can be divided into
two parts, controller platform authentication and controller
software authentication, which protects the release of sen-
sitive information and prevents unauthorized users from
capturing sensitive information.The combination of sensitive
information and random numbers, based on the strong
protection of sensitive information, ensures that sensitive
information is not being hijacked and not subject to replay
attacks by unauthorized users, thereby avoiding the security
of sensitive information by refusing the connection of those
illegal or security risks.
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Figure 1: SDN trusted domain network architecture.
2.1. Protocol Certification Process Overview. Before we design
our security certification protocol, we present the threemajor
aspects of our protocol certification process.
First, in accordance with the trust chain transfer rules
in trusted computing, the TMM is based on TSS and will
follow the orders by measuring sensitive information of SDN
controller hardware, operating system, CCM, and storing
measurement results into RTS (Root Trusted Storage) of the
PCR register.
Second, the controller platform certification: when imple-
menting different trusted domain controller authentication,
authentication requester sends the HMAC calculation results
of hardware information, operating system, and random
numbers to the receiver, respectively, and expects the iden-
tical HMAC result with the receivers. If the controller
platform’s HMAC result of the receiver is consistent with that
of the requester, then we complete the certification process of
controller platform.
Finally, the controller software certification: in terms of
implementing the trusted authentication of sensitive infor-
mation in controller software, the requester sends HMAC
calculation results, including controller software metrics,
core controller module metrics, and random numbers, to the
receiver. As shown in the controller platform certification in
Figure 1, the receiver will compare the controller software
HMAC results with that of the requester. If their results
are consistent, we complete the certification of the controller
software.
2.2. Specific Certification Process. First, we define the related
symbols used in the certification process:
(1) 𝑅: authentication requester,
(2) 𝑁: authentication receiver,
(3) 𝑁PUB: authentication requester public key,
(4) 𝑅PUB: authentication receiver public key,
(5) 𝑁−1: authentication requester private key,
(6) 𝑅−1: authentication receiver private key,
(7) Plat ID
𝑅
: authentication requester platform ID,
(8) Plat ID
𝑁
: authentication receiver platform ID,
(9) Nonce
𝑅
: random number of authentication requester,
used to measure HMAC and prevent replay attack,
(10) Nonce
𝑁
: random number of authentication receiver,
used to measure HMAC and prevent replay attack,
(11) AK
𝑅
: random number of authentication requester,
used to make a session key by authentication receiver,
(12) AK: session key,
(13) ACK: authentication successful symbol,
(14) CS ID
𝑅
: controller software ID of authentication
requester,
(15) CS ID
𝑁
: controller software ID of authentication
receiver,
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(16) 𝑅 PCR: controller platform hardware/controller plat-
form OS/controller software/controller application
module measurement of authentication requester,
(17) 𝑁 PCR: controller platform hardware/controller
platform OS/controller software/controller applica-
tion module measurement of authentication receiver,
(18) HMAC(): hash function based on HMAC SHA-1 of
TPM.
Figure 2 shows the specific certification process. More
details will be introduced in following two subsections.
2.2.1. Controller Platform Certification Process. Controller
platform certification process consists of the following steps.
Step 1 (𝑅 (the requesting controller) sends an authentication
request to 𝑁 (the receiving controller)). First, 𝑅 creates a
digital signature for its own controller platform identity infor-
mation Plat ID
𝑅
, random numbers Nonce
𝑅
, and hardware
sensitive information 𝑅 PCR
1
by its own private key. Then,
the public key of𝑁 is expected to encrypt the HMAC value,
and finally 𝑅 sends the encrypted message to𝑁:
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ Nonce
𝑅
‖ Plat ID
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
}𝑁PUB. (1)
Step 2 (𝑁 receives the authorized information from 𝑅).
First, 𝑁 receives the encrypted message including 𝑅’s ID
and 𝑁PUB from Step 1. Then, 𝑁 will implement a negotiated
registration by using 𝑅’s platform identity information. And
then, aiming at the hardware sensitive information in the 𝑅’s
platform, 𝑁 implements a credible verification which uses
PCR values of 𝑁’s hardware sensitive information to make
HMAC with Nonce
𝑅
. If the HMAC result is consistent with
𝑁 received information in Step 1, 𝑅’s hardware is trusted.
Finally, if the verification is completed,𝑁 will create a digital
signature for signing controller platform identity information
Plat ID
𝑁
, random numbers Nonce
𝑁
, and hardware sensitive
information𝑁 PCR
1
and correspondingly use the public key
of𝑅 to encrypt themand send the result to𝑅. On the contrary,
the negotiation fails:
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ Nonce
𝑁
‖ Plat ID
𝑁
}𝑁
−1
} 𝑅PUB. (2)
Step 3 (𝑅 receives the authorized information from 𝑁).
First, 𝑅 receives the verification feedback from 𝑁, which is
encrypted by the public key of 𝑅, indicating that there is
a trusted negotiation between 𝑅 and 𝑁. Second, Plat ID
𝑁
could similarly implement its negotiated registration. Third,
as shown in Step 2, 𝑅 begins the credible verification with the
hardware sensitive information of𝑁; if the results are consis-
tent,𝑁 can be trusted in hardware. Finally, if the verification
passes, 𝑅 will generate trust negotiation session random
numbers; meanwhile 𝑁 creates the negotiated private key
and implements the next round trust negotiation. 𝑅 will
sign sensitive information of controller platform operating
system HMAC value and encrypt the sensitive information
by session key. The negotiation fails when the verification is
not successfully passed:
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ AK
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
}𝑁PUB. (3)
Step 4 (𝑁 receives the HMAC sensitive information of
the controller platform operating system 𝑅 PCR
2
and key
random numbers of 𝑅, AKR). First, 𝑁 receives 𝑅 PCR2
and implements a credible verification, as shown in Step 2,
with the operating system measurement result 𝑁 PCR
2
of
its own controller. Second, if the verification passes, 𝑁 will
produce a negotiated private key random number AK
𝑁
.
Then, using AK
𝑅
, AK
𝑁
, the pseudo random numbers, and
functionPRGF,𝑁will create a controller software verification
session private key AK, which is bound with the platform
information of 𝑅. Finally, 𝑁’s platform sends the sensitive
information HMAC value of 𝑁 to 𝑅. The negotiation fails if
the credible verification is not successfully passed:
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ ACK ‖ AK}𝑁−1} 𝑅PUB. (4)
2.2.2. Controller Software Certification Process. In this sub-
section, we continue to explain the steps in certification
process. These steps are related to the controller software
certification process.
Step 5 (𝑅 receives the sensitive information HMAC value
from the receiving controller platform operating system).
First, 𝑅 receives the operating system sensitive information
from the receiving controller platform and implements a
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Figure 2: Trusted domain authentication process.
credible verification, as shown in Step 2, with the operating
system measurement result 𝑅 PCR
2
of its own controller
platform. Then, if the credible verification passes, the trust
negotiation will enter into the controller software verification
process, and, therefore, session private key AK will bind the
information of 𝑁 and also sign the encrypted information
through 𝑅’s private key. Finally, 𝑅 returns the signed infor-
mation to𝑁. The negotiation fails if the credible verification
fails:
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
3
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ CS ID
𝑅
}AK} 𝑅−1. (5)
Step 6 (𝑁 receives the controller software verification request
from 𝑅). First,𝑁 decrypts the information by 𝑅’s public key,
proving the existing base of the trust negotiation between 𝑅
and 𝑁. Then, using the decryption of the sensitive informa-
tion HMAC value of the controller software, 𝑁 implements
a credible verification as shown in Step 2. If the credible
verification passes, 𝑁 will proceed a negotiated registration
using the controller software information CS ID
𝑅
of 𝑅,
encrypt the sensitive information HMAC value of controller
software and the controller software ID through session
private key AK, and sign the encrypted information through
𝑅’s private key. Finally, 𝑁 returns the signed information
to 𝑅. The negotiation fails if the credible verification is not
successfully passed:
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
3
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ CS ID
𝑁
}AK}𝑁−1. (6)
Step 7 (𝑅 receives the verification information from𝑁). First,
as shown in Step 6, using the sensitive information HMAC
value of the controller software, the receiving controller
implements a credible verification as shown in Step 2.Then, if
the credible verification passes,𝑅will implement a negotiated
registration using the controller software information of𝑁.𝑅
encrypts the sensitive information HMAC value of 𝑅 PCR
4
and Nonce
𝑅
through session private key AK and signs the
encrypted information by 𝑅’s private key. Finally, 𝑁 returns
the signed information to 𝑅. The negotiation fails if the
credible verification is not successfully passed:
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
4
,Nonce
𝑅
)}AK} 𝑅−1. (7)
Step 8. First, receiving controller software application mod-
ules HMAC value of 𝑅,𝑁 implements a credible verification
as shown in Step 2. Then, if the credible verification passes,
𝑁 will encrypt the sensitive information HMAC value of
𝑁 PCR
4
and Nonce
𝑁
by session private key AK and sign
the encrypted information by 𝑅’s private key. Finally, 𝑅
implements a credible verification on application module
sensitive information of𝑁, shown in Step 2. If the verification
passes, the verification of the controller software will be com-
pleted and the controller verificationwill pass. Otherwise, the
negotiation fails:
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
4
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ ACK}AK}𝑁−1. (8)
3. BAN Logic Security Analysis
According to the BAN logic security analysis, this section
analyzes whether our authentication protocol is secure or not.
3.1. BAN Logic Security Analysis. BAN predicate logic is
composed of 10 basic syntax and semantic clauses:
(1) 𝑄 |≡ 𝐴 𝑄 believes that 𝐴 is credible.
(2) 𝑄 ⊲ 𝐴 𝑄 receives message 𝐴.
(3) 𝑄 |∼ 𝐴 𝑄 has sent message 𝐴.
(4) 𝑄 |⇒ 𝐴 𝑄 has jurisdiction for message 𝐴.
(5) #(𝐴): message 𝐴 is fresh, which means that 𝐴 is
temporary value and not the first to be sent as the
information.
(6) 𝑃
Key
←󳨀→ 𝑄: the key is shared key between 𝑃 and 𝑄.
(7)
Key
󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑄 or |
Key
󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑄: key is 𝑄’s public key.
(8) 𝑃
𝑋
󴀘󴀯 𝑄 𝑋 events are shared secrets between 𝑃 and𝑄.
(9) {𝑋}Key: message𝑋 is encrypted by key.
(10) ⟨𝑋⟩
𝑌
is the cascade of information of𝑋 and 𝑌.
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3.2. BAN Logic Inference Rules. This section describes the
four main specific rules of BAN logic to provide a theoretical
basis for SDN trusted domains security authentication proto-
col. ⊢ is primitive symbol, such as 𝑃 ⊢ 𝑄 representing that 𝑃
derives conclusions 𝑄.
(1) Message Meaning Rule
Theorem 1. Consider
𝑃 |≡
𝐾
󳨀→ 𝑄,
𝑃 <| {𝑋}
𝐾
−1 ⊢ 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋.
(9)
Explanation. If 𝑃 believes that 𝑄’s public key is 𝐾, and 𝑃 has
received the message {𝑋}
𝐾
−1 which is encrypted by𝐾−1, we can
infer that 𝑃 believes message𝑋 which was sent by 𝑄.
(2) Temporary Value Validation Rules
Theorem 2. Consider
𝑃 |≡ # (𝑋) ,
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋 ⊢ 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋.
(10)
Explanation. If 𝑃 believes that message 𝑋 is fresh, and 𝑃
believes that𝑄 has sent message𝑋, we can infer that 𝑃 believes
that 𝑄 believes the message𝑋.
(3) Jurisdiction Rules
Theorem 3. Consider
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |⇒ 𝑋,
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |≡ 𝑋 ⊢ 𝑃 |≡ 𝑋.
(11)
Explanation. If 𝑃 believes that 𝑄 has jurisdiction for message
𝑋, and 𝑃 believes that 𝑄 believes message 𝑋, we can infer that
𝑃 believes the message𝑋.
(4) Receive Messages Rules
Theorem 4. Consider
𝑃 <| (𝑋, 𝑌) ⊢ 𝑃 <|𝑋. (12)
Theorem 5. Consider
𝑃 |≡
𝐾
󳨀→ 𝑄,
𝑃 <| {𝑋}
𝐾
−1 ⊢ 𝑃 <|𝑋.
(13)
Theorem 6. Consider
𝑃 |≡ 𝑃
𝐾
←→ 𝑄,
𝑃 <| {𝑋}
𝐾
⊢ 𝑃 <|𝑋.
(14)
Explanation. The above theorem states that if a subject has
received a formula, and themain part knows the relevant secret
key, we can infer that the body has received part of the formula.
(5) Belief Rules
Theorem 7. Consider
𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ (𝑋, 𝑌) ⊢ 𝑃 |≡ 𝑄 |∼ 𝑋. (15)
Explanation. If 𝑃 believes that 𝑄 has sent a (𝑋, 𝑌), then 𝑃
believes that 𝑄 has sent message𝑋.
3.3. SDN Trusted Domain Security Authentication Protocol’s
Formal Presentation. In this section, we formalize SDN trust-
ed domain security authentication protocol:
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ Nonce
𝑅
‖ Plat ID
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
}𝑁PUB,
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ Nonce
𝑁
‖ Plat ID
𝑁
}𝑁
−1
} 𝑅PUB,
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ AK
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
}𝑁PUB,
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ ACK ‖ AK}𝑁−1} 𝑅PUB,
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
3
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ CS ID
𝑅
}AK} 𝑅−1,
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
3
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ CS ID
𝑁
}AK}𝑁−1,
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
4
,Nonce
𝑅
)}AK} 𝑅−1,
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
4
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ ACK}AK}𝑁−1.
(16)
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3.4. BAN Logic Security Goals. For security requirements of
SDN trusted domains security authentication protocol, this
paper sets up multiple security goals:
(1) 𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ 𝑅 PCR: 𝑁 believes that 𝑅 is credible to
believe 𝑅 PCR.
(2) 𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ 𝑁 PCR: 𝑅 believes that 𝑁 is credible to
believe𝑁 PCR.
(3) 𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ Nonce
𝑅
: 𝑁 believes that 𝑅 is credible to
believe Nonce
𝑅
.
(4) 𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ Nonce
𝑁
: 𝑅 believes that 𝑁 is credible to
believe Nonce
𝑁
.
(5) 𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ Plat ID
𝑅
: 𝑁 believes that 𝑅 is credible to
believe Plat ID
𝑅
.
(6) 𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ Plat ID
𝑁
: 𝑅 believes that 𝑁 is credible to
believe Plat ID
𝑁
.
(7) 𝑁 |≡ AK
𝑅
: 𝑁 believes that AK
𝑅
is credible.
(8) 𝑅 |≡ AK: 𝑅 believes that AK is credible.
(9) 𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ CS ID
𝑅
: 𝑁 believes that 𝑅 is credible to
believe CS ID
𝑅
.
(10) 𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ CS ID
𝑁
, 𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ ACK: 𝑅 believes that
𝑁 is credible to believe CS ID
𝑁
.
(11) 𝑅 believes that𝑁 is credible to believe ACK.
3.5. BAN Logic Initialization Assumptions. In order to verify
the authentication protocol compliance with BAN logic, we
make the initialization assumptions of BAN logic:
𝑅 |≡
𝑁PUB
󳨀󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑁,
𝑁 |≡
𝑅PUB
󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑅,
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |⇒ AK
𝑅
,
𝑁 |≡ # (𝑅 PCR) ,
𝑁 |≡ # (Nonce
𝑅
) ,
𝑁 |≡ # (AK
𝑅
) ,
𝑅 |≡ # (𝑁 PCR) ,
𝑅 |≡ # (Nonce
𝑁
) .
(17)
3.6. BAN Logic Secure Analysis. This section will use the
BAN predicate logic inference to verify the authentication
protocol’s security goals, which is based on the BAN logic
initialization assumptions of Section 3.5.
(1) Inference 1: From Step 1
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ Nonce
𝑅
‖ Plat ID
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
}𝑁PUB. (18)
⟨1⟩ ∵ 𝑁 |≡
𝑅PUB
󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑅,
𝑁 <| {Hash (𝑅 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ Nonce
𝑅
‖ Plat ID
𝑅
‖ Plat ID
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
. (19)
⟨2⟩ ∴ FromTheorem 1, we can infer
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |∼ {Hash (𝑅 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ Nonce
𝑅
‖ Plat ID
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
. (20)
⟨3⟩ ∵ FromTheorems 5 and 7 ∴ we can infer
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |∼ 𝑅 PCR
1
,
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |∼ Nonce
𝑅
,
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |∼ Plat ID
𝑅
.
(21)
⟨4⟩ ∵ 𝑁 |≡ # (𝑅 PCR) and 𝑁 |≡ # (Nonce
𝑅
) and 𝑁 |≡
# (Plat ID
𝑅
).
⟨5⟩ ∴ FromTheorem 2, we can get the conclusions
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ 𝑅 PCR,
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ Nonce
𝑅
,
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ Plat ID
𝑅
.
(22)
(2) Inference 2: From Step 2
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
1
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ Nonce
𝑁
‖ Plat ID
𝑁
}𝑁
−1
} 𝑅PUB. (23)
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⟨1⟩ Same as inference 1, we can get the conclusions
𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ 𝑁 PCR,
𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ Nonce
𝑁
,
𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ Plat ID
𝑁
.
(24)
(3) Inference 3: From Step 3
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ AK
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
}𝑁PUB. (25)
⟨1⟩ ∵ 𝑁 |≡
𝑅PUB
󳨀󳨀󳨀→ 𝑅,
𝑁 <| {Hash (𝑅 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ AK
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
. (26)
⟨2⟩ ∴ FromTheorem 1, we can infer
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |∼ {Hash (𝑅 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ AK
𝑅
} 𝑅
−1
. (27)
⟨3⟩ ∵ FromTheorems 5 and 7
∴ we can infer𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |∼ AK
𝑅
.
⟨4⟩ ∵ 𝑁 |≡# (AK
𝑅
).
∴ FromTheorem 2, we can infer
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ AK
𝑅
. (28)
⟨5⟩ ∵ 𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |⇒ AK
𝑅
and𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ AK
𝑅
.
FromTheorem 3, we can infer𝑁 |≡ AK
𝑅
.
(4) Inference 4: From Step 4
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
2
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ ACK ‖ AK}𝑁−1} 𝑅PUB. (29)
⟨1⟩ Same as inference 3, we can get the conclusions
𝑅 |≡ AK. (30)
(5) Inference 5: From Steps 5 and 6
𝑅 󳨀→ 𝑁 : {{HMAC (𝑅 PCR
3
,Nonce
𝑅
) ‖ CS ID
𝑅
}AK} 𝑅−1,
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
3
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ CS ID
𝑁
}AK}𝑁−1.
(31)
⟨1⟩ Same as inference 1, we can get the conclusions
𝑁 |≡ 𝑅 |≡ CS ID
𝑅
,
𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ CS ID
𝑁
.
(32)
(6) Inference 6: From Step 8
𝑁 󳨀→ 𝑅 : {{HMAC (𝑁 PCR
4
,Nonce
𝑁
) ‖ ACK}AK}𝑁−1. (33)
⟨1⟩ Same as inference 1, we can get the conclusions
𝑅 |≡ 𝑁 |≡ ACK. (34)
From the above BANpredicate logic inference, we can get
that the conclusions conform to the BAN logic security goals
which are defined in Section 3.4. Obviously, PCR, random
numbers, and session key are important to the authentication
protocol. From the BAN predicate logic inference, we have
proved that sensitive information can meet the demands of
network security.
4. Protocol Security Testing
This section will use the Dolev-Yao (DY) attack model [23]
for actual security testing. The DY attack model could have
the following variety of knowledge:
(1) Attackers are familiar with encryption, decryption,
hashing, and other cryptographic operations, and
they have the public key andprivate key of themselves.
(2) Attackers hold the network identity and public key of
each subject.
(3) Attackers have basic password analysis ability.
Attackers could perform a variety of attacks, such as
replay attack.
4.1. Security Goals. The DY attack model can control the
entire network and catch the data for tampering attack and
replay attack. For ensuring the protocol security, the authenti-
cation protocol must be detected by DY attack model. To this
end, this paper sets up multiple security objections [24] for
the DY attack model:
(1) 𝑁 PCR/𝑅 PCR value is confidential during transmis-
sion.
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(2) Random number, Nonce
𝑅
/Nonce
𝑁
, is confidential
during transmission.
(3) AK
𝑅
is confidential during transmission.
(4) Controller platform ID/controller software ID is con-
fidential during transmission.
(5) Controller software authentication session key is con-
fidential.
(6) Successful certification logo (ACK) is completed.
4.1.1. Security Goals Formalization. In response to these secu-
rity goals, this paper will test the safety of the authentication
protocol using AVISPA network analysis tool. For testing
protocol security, the AVISPA network interaction protocol
security analysis system makes a formalized definition about
test method of protocol security goals. Description is shown
below.
(1) Information Confidential Test
Secret (E, id, S).This is a statement whichmeans that subject S
shares information E, and this secret is named an unchanged
id which will be used in the goals definition.
(2) Information Verification Test
Witness (A, B, id, E). This is a weak authentication attribute,
whichmeans that A declares that A has sent a message E to B,
and this statement is named an unchanged id which will be
used in the goals definition.
Request (B, A, id, E). This is a strong authentication attribute,
which means that B declares that B has received a message E
from A, and this statement is named an unchanged id which
will be used in the goals definition.
WRequest (B, A, id, E).This is aweak authentication attribute,
which is similar to Request (B, A, id, E), but it does not verify
replay attacks.
4.1.2. Modeling and Simulating Security Goals. In this section
we will use HLPSL to build security goals modeling, which is
based on formal definition of security objectives.
(1) For testing the security goals in Section 4.1.1, the
authentication requesting platform needs to verify
PCR, random numbers, and platform id of the
authentication received platform. The HLPSL code
appears as shown in Box 1.
(2) Obviously, the authentication receiving platform also
needs to verify PCR, random numbers, and platform
id of the authentication requesting platform. The
HLPSL code appears as shown in Box 2.
4.2. Security Test
4.2.1. Test Scenarios. For the security goals, this paper sets
up three test scenarios to verify whether the protocol satisfies
the security goals or not. As shown in Table 1, in Scenario 1,
Role sdnTNap Init(A,B : agent,
Kab :symmetric key,
H :hash func,
Ap Start, Ap Init, Ap aSuccess : text,
SND,RCV: channel(dy)
)
played by A
init State :=0
transition
∧request(A,B,b a K1ab,K1ab')
∧request(A,B,b a SIGKpubKb,SIGKpubKb')
∧secret(K1ab',k1ab,{A,B})
∧request(A,B,b a bNonce,BNonce')
∧request(A,B,bpcr1,H(BPcr1'.BNonce'))
∧request(A,B,bpcr2,H(BPcr2'.BNonce'))
∧request(A,B,bpcr3,H(BPcr3'.BNonce'))
∧request(A,B,bpcr4,H(BPcr4'.BNonce'))
end role
Box 1
role sdnTNap reply(A,B : agent,
Kab : symmetric key,
H : hash func,
Ap Start,Ap Init,Ap aSuccess,Ap bSuccess :
text,
SND,RCV:
channel(dy)
)
played by B
init State :=1
transition
∧request(B,A,a b SIGKpubKa,SIGKpubKa')
∧request(B,A,a b aNonce,ANonce')
∧request(B,A,apcr1,H(APcr1'.ANonce'))
∧request(B,A,apcr2,H(APcr2'.ANonce'))
∧request(B,A,apcr3,H(APcr3'.ANonce'))
∧request(B,A,apcr4,H(APcr4'.ANonce'))
15.State = 15∧RCV(Ap aSuccess') = |>
State':=17∧SND(Ap bSuccess)
end role
Box 2
we implemented a single session with all the roles played by
legitimate agents. In Scenario 2 and Scenario 3 we tested the
situations, in which the intruder would impersonate each of
the legitimate agents: the authentication requesting controller
platform (Scenario 2) and the authentication receiving con-
troller platform (Scenario 3).
4.2.2. Test Results. As shown in Boxes 3 and 4, the authentica-
tion protocol passed OFMC security test and ATSE security
test, and the authentication protocol is not attacked by DY
model, so we can conclude that the authentication protocol is
secure.
From the summary details of Boxes 3 and 4, we can
see that our authentication protocol is tested by CL-AtSe
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Table 1: Scenario description of security test.
Scenario Scenario description
(1) session(a,b,kab,h, ap start,ap init,ap Asuccess,ap Bsuccess)
(2) session(a,i,kai,h, ap start,ap init,ap Asuccess,ap Bsuccess)
(3) session(i,b,kib,h, ap start,ap init,ap Asuccess,ap Bsuccess)
% OFMC
% Version of 2006/02/13
SUMMARY
SAFE
DETAILS
BOUNDED NUMBER OF SESSIONS
PROTOCOL
D:\...\NPLAB\temp\130476350162500000.if
GOAL
as specified
BACKEND
OFMC
COMMENTS
STATISTICS
parseTime: 0.00s
searchTime: 0.04s
visitedNodes: 1 nodes
depth: 0 plies
Box 3: Security test result of OFMC system.
model and OFMC system, based on constraint logic, and our
protocol was analyzed by 4 states. So, the conclusion of our
test is quite convincing.
5. Performance Analysis
5.1. Calculation Consumption. This section uses the authen-
tication response time defined in [25] to evaluate the
calculation overhead of the protocol. The authentication
response time (𝑇) is mainly composed of three parts: the
authentication requesting platform computing time (𝑇
𝑅
), the
authentication receiving platform computing time (𝑇
𝑁
), and
the protocol transmission time (𝑇
𝑇
). The following relation-
ship can be obtained through the above three variables:
𝑇 = 𝑇
𝑅
+ 𝑇
𝑁
+ 𝑇
𝑇
. (35)
Thus, we define the authentication requesting platform
computing time including operation overhead of HMAC,
digital sign, and encryption and decryption.
Similarly, we define the authentication receiving platform
computing time including operation overhead of HMAC,
digital sign, and encryption and decryption.
In particular, we consider that the ideal transport network
excludes the impact of network latency.
TYPED MODEL
PROTOCOL
D:\...\NPLAB\temp\130476352862187500.if
GOAL
As Specified
BACKEND
CL-AtSe
STATISTICS
Analysed : 4 states
Reachable : 0 states
Translation: 0.14 seconds
Computation: 0.00 seconds
Box 4: Security test result of ATSE system.
According to the above definition, the calculation over-
head of authentication protocol is mainly composed of
HMAC, digital sign,message encryption and decryption, and
the network transmission. As shown in Table 2, we make a
detailed comparison between IKEv2, IDAKE-MA [26], and
SKAP in this paper.
It can be seen in Table 2 that the authentication protocol
of this paper has higher calculation consumption compared
with other domain protocols. In particular, we propose a
no third party certification method. So our approach has
advantages in communication frequency, which effectively
reduces the total number of communications and network
overhead. Furthermore, the authentication protocol is based
on trusted computing, which effectively protects the cred-
ibility of network domains, and the trusted authentication
protocol could make more advantages in security. Last but
not the least, the authentication protocol does not have
index calculation. Compared with other protocols in Table 2,
our approach could significantly improve computational
efficiency and reduce the cost of computing.
5.2. Storage Consumption. For the authentication protocol
of this paper, we assume that the average frequency of the
requester connecting to the receiver under random condi-
tions is 1/𝑇access, and the process of receiving request can be
modeled as a Poisson process, where the average frequency is
1/𝑇access. Using the receiver as an example, when the receiver
receives a request message, the receiver needs to store the
public key of the requester (𝑅public), the random number of
the requester (Nonce
𝑅
), and the session key (AK) until the
session is completed or the timer is over. We assumed the
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Table 2: Comparison in the performance of protocols.
Protocol Communication Communicationbetween domains Encryption/decryption
Digital
sign Hash/index calculation
IKEv2 12 5 0 14 0/0
IDAKE-MA 14 6 6 5 0/2
SKAP 10 4 4 3 0/2
Our method 8 8 8 8 8/0
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Figure 3: The storage consumption of our method.
time of wait timer is 𝑇lifetime, the response time of receiving
the message is 𝑇req, and the packet loss rate of experiment
network is 𝑃loss, and we derived that the storage average
amount of the receiver is
2 × [
1
𝑇access
× 𝑇lifetime × 𝑃loss +
1
𝑇access
× 𝑇req
× (1 − 𝑃loss)] .
(36)
Assuming the time of the latency timer is two times that
of the response message time, we can further simplify that
the storage average amount of the receiver is 𝑇lifetime/𝑇access ×
(𝑃loss + 1).
According to the above formula, on the one hand, if
𝑇lifetime and 𝑇access remain unchanged, the storage consump-
tion is proportional to the network packet loss rate. If
the network is stable and packet loss rate is not high, the
authentication protocol of proposed in this paper does not
require a low storage space to store data, and the storage
consumption is in the ideal range.
On the other hand, as shown in Figure 3, if 𝑃loss remains
unchanged, the storage consumption is proportional to
𝑇lifetime and 𝑇access. It means that if controllers’ processing
time is too long, the controller will continue to receive
request, and thus the storage consumption will increase
sharply.
So far we assumed that the 𝑃loss rate remains unchanged.
We further perform a comparative analysis with IKEv2,
IDAKE-MA, and SKAP. The results are shown in Figures 4,
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Figure 4: The storage consumption of SKAP.
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Figure 5: The storage consumption of IDAKE-MA.
5, and 6; our method has more advantages in terms of storage
consumption.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced and demonstrated a security
authentication protocol of SDN trusted domain in ADS
applications and designed the trusted domain network archi-
tecture to solve the credential problem of SDN architecture.
The trust negotiation concept with nontrusted third party
is a prerequisite for communication between different SDN
trusted domains in ADS applications.
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The main contributions are as follows: (1) Our protocol
does not contain any unnecessary information. We analyzed
the redundant information by BAN logical system.The results
show that the protocol is a concise protocol. (2)The protocol
is secure in theory. The BAN logic security analysis has
proved that our protocol is secure. (3)The protocol is secure
in experiment. We demonstrate the security of our trusted
domain authentication protocol by BAN logic and AVISPA
security analysis tool, and we compared our trusted domain
authentication protocolwith other prevalent protocols in per-
formance analysis. Our work fills the gap of mutual trust
betweendifferent trusted domains andprovides security foun-
dation for interaction between different trusted domains.
In the paper we considered replay attacks and intermedi-
ator attacks. In the future, we plan to consider other attacker
behavior models including opportunistic collusion attacks,
random attacks, and insidious attacks to further demonstrate
superiority of our protocol.
Competing Interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by Funding Project for Beijing
Key Laboratory of Trusted Computing, National Engineering
Laboratory for Critical Technologies of Information Security
Classified Protection, Open Research Fund of Beijing Key
Laboratory of Trusted Computing, and 2015 Intelligent Man-
ufacturing Special Project: The Comprehensive Standardized
Test.The paper is also supported by a Beijing Natural Science
Foundation project (no. 4162006).
References
[1] K. Mori, “Assured service-oriented system engineering tech-
nologies and applications,” in Proceedings of the Fifth Interna-
tional Symposiumon ServiceOriented SystemEngineering (SOSE
’10), 4 pages, Nanjing, China, June 2010.
[2] H. Takahashi, K.Mori, andH. F.Ahmad, “Efficient I/O intensive
multi tenant SaaS system using L4 level cache,” in Proceedings
of the 5th IEEE International Symposium on Service Oriented
System Engineering (SOSE ’10), pp. 222–228, IEEE, Nanjing,
China, June 2010.
[3] H. Takahashi, K. Mori, and H. F. Ahmad, “Autonomous short
latency system for web application layer firewall,” in Proceedings
of the 6th World Congress on Services (SERVICES ’10), pp. 447–
452, Miami, Fla, USA, July 2010.
[4] Q. Zuo, M. Xie, and W.-T. Tsai, “Autonomous decentralized
tenant access control model for sub-tenancy architecture in
software-as-a-service (SaaS),” in Proceedings of the 12th IEEE
International Symposium on Autonomous Decentralized Systems
(ISADS ’15), pp. 211–216, IEEE, Taichung, Taiwan, March 2015.
[5] Y. Chen and Y. Kakuda, “Autonomous decentralised systems in
web computing environment,” International Journal of Critical
Computer-Based Systems, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–5, 2011.
[6] Y. Chen and W. T. Tsai, Service-Oriented Computing and Web
Software Integration, Kendall Hunt, 5th edition, 2015.
[7] M. Casado, T. Garfinkel, A. Akella et al., “SANE: a protection
architecture for enterprise networks,” in Proceedings of the 15th
USENIX Security Symposium, Vancouver, Canada, July-August
2006.
[8] M. Casado, M. J. Freedman, J. Pettit et al., “Ethane: taking con-
trol of the enterprise,”ACMSIGCOMMComputer Communica-
tion Review, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 1–12, 2007.
[9] D. Li, X. Hong, and J. Bowman, “Evaluation of security vulner-
abilities by using ProtoGENI as a launchpad,” in Proceedings of
the IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM
’11), pp. 1–6, IEEE, Houston, Tex, USA, December 2011.
[10] K. Benton, L. J. Camp, and C. Small, “OpenFlow vulnerability
assessment,” in Proceedings of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Work-
shop on Hot Topics in Software Defined Networking (HotSDN
’13), pp. 151–152, ACM, Hong Kong, China, August 2013.
[11] A. Shalimov, D. Zuikov, D. Zimarina, V. Pashkov, and R.
Smeliansky, “Advanced study of SDN/OpenFlow controllers,”
in Proceedings of the 9th Central & Eastern European Software
Engineering Conference in Russia (CEE-SECR ’13), vol. 1, ACM,
Moscow, Russia, October 2013.
[12] N. Gude, T. Koponen, J. Pettit et al., “NOX: towards an operat-
ing system for networks,” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Commu-
nication Review, vol. 38, no. 3, pp. 105–110, 2008.
[13] L. Rodrigues Prete, C. M. Schweitzer, A. A. Shinoda, and R. L.
Santos de Oliveira, “Simulation in an SDN network scenario
using the POX controller,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Colombian
Conference on Communications and Computing (COLCOM ’14),
pp. 1–6, IEEE, Bogota´, Colombia, June 2014.
[14] Ryu documentation, http://osrg.github.com/ryu/.
[15] D. Erickson, “The beacon openflow controller,” in Proceedings
of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMMWorkshop on Hot Topics in Software
Defined Networking (HotSDN ’13), pp. 13–18, ACM,Hong Kong,
August 2013.
[16] D. Kreutz, F. Ramos, and P. Verissimo, “Towards secure and
dependable software-defined networks,” in Proceedings of the
2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Hot Topics in Software
Defined Networking (HotSDN ’13), pp. 55–60, Hong Kong,
China, August 2013.
[17] C. Kaufman, “Internet key exchange (IKEv2) protocol,” RFC
4306, 2005, http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4306.
[18] L. Chen and M. Ryan, “Attack, solution and verification for
shared authorisation data in TCG TPM,” in Formal Aspects
in Security and Trust, vol. 5983 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pp. 201–216, Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2010.
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 13
[19] K. Fan, H. Li, and Y. Wang, “Security analysis of the kerberos
protocol using BAN logic,” in Proceedings of the 5th Interna-
tional Conference on Information Assurance and Security (IAS
’09), pp. 467–470, Xi’an, China, September 2009.
[20] F. Dadeau, P.-C. He´am, and R. Kheddam, “Mutation-based test
generation from security protocols in HLPSL,” in Proceedings
of the 4th IEEE International Conference on Software Testing,
Verification, and Validation (ICST ’11), pp. 240–248, IEEE,
Berlin, Germany, March 2011.
[21] Y. Yang, H. Zhang, M. Pan, J. Yang, F. He, and Z. Li, “A model-
based fuzz framework to the security testing of TCG software
stack implementations,” in Proceedings of the 1st International
Conference onMultimedia Information Networking and Security
(MINES ’09), pp. 149–152, IEEE, Hubei, China, November 2009.
[22] TCG TPM, Main Part 1: Design Principles, Specification Ver-
sion, 1, 2003.
[23] P. N. Mahalle, B. Anggorojati, N. R. Prasad, and R. Prasad,
“Identity establishment and capability based access control
(IECAC) scheme for internet of things,” in Proceedings of the
15th International Symposium on Wireless Personal Multimedia
Communications (WPMC ’12), pp. 187–191, IEEE, Taipei, Tai-
wan, September 2012.
[24] N. Toledo,M.Higuero, J. Astorga,M.Aguado, and J.M. Bonnin,
“Design and formal security evaluation of NeMHIP: a new
secure and efficient network mobility management protocol
based on theHost Identity Protocol,”Computers & Security, vol.
32, pp. 1–18, 2013.
[25] J. Liu, J. Liao, X. Zhu et al., “Password authentication scheme for
mobile computing environment,” Journal on Communications,
vol. 5, article 005, 2007.
[26] P. Huaxi, “An identity-based authentication model for multi-
domain,” Journal of Computers, vol. 29, no. 8, pp. 1271–1281,
2006.
